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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

EVIDENCE-ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AS APPLIED
TO ADVICE BY AN ATTORNEY TO HIS CLIENT,
REFLECTING ON JUDICIAL INTEGRITY

A recent case from the Federal District Court for Nevada,
In re Bull,1 raises some interesting problems as to the extent to

which an attorney's advice which reflects on judicial integrity
is privileged. The attorney who was a defendant in a disbarment
2;; Section 81-319 of the Nebraska Blue-Sky Law imposes a minor exception to this conclusion. The Blue-Sky Law requires corporations which
have been in continuous operation less than three years, and those which,
having been in continuous operation more than three years, have not met
certain minimum earnings requirements to obtain an authorization order
from the Department of Banking before issuing or selling securities. Any
applicant receiving such an authorization order is prohibited by § 81-319
from declaring or distributing a " ... dividend of any kind or _in any amount
whatsoever until such dividend has been actually earned and received by
the applicant through the medium of net profits earned and received by
the applicant from its business at the time such dividend is declared.''
This restriction, which applies to only a very small fraction of the
corporations operating in the state, seems to be grounded on a theory that:
(a) at least three years is required for a corporation to become established
to the point where it can operate with no further state supervision, and
that (b) during this period of incipiency it deceives the shareholders and
creditors to pay dividends from a source other than profits actually earned
and received.
This exception to § 21-175 supports the general tenor of the policy
considerations outlined above, but since it covers such an insignificant
portion of the existing corporations, it can hardly be interpreted as conflicting with § 21-175.

1123 F. Supp. 389 (D. Nev. 1954).
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proceeding had unsuccessfully represented a client in a previous
criminal case, and the client was serving a jail sentence. In a
letter2 to the client on the advisability of appealing the conviction,
the attorney stated, among other things, that experience had shown
that the records of any trial in that judge's court were emasculated when an appeal was taken; that the judge had a very dear
friend on the circuit court; and that the conduct of the judge
at trial had been so reprehensible that the attorney was willing
to go to great lengths to secure a reversal. The letter was intercepted by the client's jailor and was made the basis for the
disbarment action. The court decided that the letter was clearly
not a privileged communication and was admissible in evidence.
But the court concluded that an attorney's advice to an hnprisoned
client could not be made the basis for disbarment since the client
might thereby be deprived of his constitutional right to effective
assistance from counsel.3
A slight variation of the Bull facts could produce a common,
and yet difficult and infrequently litigated situation. Assume
that a similar letter had been sent to a client not in prison; or
that similar contemptuous remarks had been made in confidence
by the attorney to his client in the privacy of the attorney's
chambers and in preparation for civil litigation. Assume further that such remarks were made (a) in good faith and with
sound justification in fact, or (b) with malicious intentions and
without the slightest foundation in fact. In what manner and
to what extent are such remarks privileged?
A privilege may be either of two types: (1) an evidentiary
privilege, such as an attorney-client privilege or physician-patient
privilege, under which the remarks would be completely inadmissible in evidence, or (2) a substantive privilege, such as used
in the law of defamation, under which an attorney's advice would
be admitted in evidence but would be considered (a) qualifiedly
privileged, or (b) absolutely privileged. A qualified substantive
privilege remains operative only as long as reasonably and honestly used, while an absolute substantive privilege would protect
an attorney's remarks no matter how unreasonable or malicious
they might be.
The purpose of this note is (1) to examine the attorney-client
evidentiary privilege to determine under what circumstances an
attorney's advice, reflecting upon judicial integrity, is privileged
2 The letter is set
3 In re Bull, 123

forth in totum at 390 in the Bidl case.
F. Supp. 389 (D. Nev. 1954).
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from admission in evidence, and (2) to determine the nature of
a substantive privilege, if any, that may be extended to such advice.

I.

The Att01'ney-Client Privilege in Evidence
A.

HISTORICAL AND POLICY BASIS

Historically, the basis of the attorney-client privilege was
the theory that the honor of the attorney could not be violated
by compelling him to reveal anything conveyed to him in confidence by a client.-! Therefore, the privilege was originally for
the benefit of the attorney and not the client. But under modern
theory it is generally agreed that the privilege is exclusively for
the benefit of the client.u It is felt that in the present complex
society, the fullest freedom of communication between a client and
his attorney should be encouraged if justice is to be done; and
only by granting a privilege to this communication can such a
result be achieved. Further, proper presentation of the client's
cause is believed to outweigh the possible harm resulting from
suppressing such evidence in particular cases.6
A necessary corollary of the privilege has been its extension
to communications from the attorney to his client as well as from
the client to the attorney. Since the privilege was first said to
be for the attorney, the early cases assumed that such communications were inadmissible. 7 As a result, the question of whether
the lawyer's communications are privileged has seldom been
raised. 8 The reason lies generally in the possibility that inferences could be drawn from the attorney's advice, which might
tend to disclose the client's original communication. Hence, advice given by an attorney, which might tend, if disclosed, to reveal a previous communication from a client, is universally thought
to be privileged from admission in evidence.
4 See 8 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2290, 2291 (3d ed. 1940) for a general
review of the history and policy basis of the privilege. See Model Code
of Evidence, Rule 210. comment a (1942).
u 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2321 (3d ed. 1940); Morgan and Maguire,
Cases and 1\Iaterials on Evidence 376 n. 53 (3d ed. 1951).
tl Prichard v. United States, 181 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1950), aff'd per
curiam, 339 U.S. 974 (1950); United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Corporation, 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950); :Model Code of Evidence.
Rule 210, comment a (1942).
7 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2320 (3d ed. 1940).
~ Wigmore cites only one case raising the question, and a reasonably
exhaustive search by the writer yielded no further cases in which it was
contended that communications from attorney to client might not come
within the privilege.
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It is interesting to note, however, that remarks by an attorney questioning judicial integrity, as in the Bull situation, or the
hypothetical situations posed above, will often have no direct relation to an earlier communication by the client. That is, their
introduction into evidence will not reveal an earlier communication from the client. Case authority for the privilege or nonprivilege status of such remarks is practically non-existent;!! It
has been argued, however, that in such situations an attorney
should be given complete freedom to express his frank opinions
to his client, and the best way to accomplish this purpose is to
include such remarks within the attorney-client privilege.

Undoubtedly, under proper circumstances it may be desirable
to encourage an attorney to take his client into confidence and
comment on deficiencies in the judiciary which he honestly and
reasonably believes may have a bearing on the presentation of
a client's cause. If the attorney could not comment on the conduct of the judiciary, he might hesitate to speak when he should,
and his client's cause might thereby suffer. Indeed, Canon 8
of the Canons of Professional Ethics may lend some support to
the argument. It states:
A lawyer should endeavor to obtain full knowledge of his client's
cause before advising thereon, and he is bound to give a candid
opinion of the merits and probable result of pending or contemplated litigation.IO

If Canon 8 is to be complied with, an attorney obviously cannot close his eyes to the possibility of shortcomings in the operation of our judicial system, and if he perceives such shortcomings, it may be his ethical duty to call them to his client's attention.
The argument, of course, does not suggest that malicious or
reckless attacks against the judiciary should be encouraged. But
it should be carefully noted that exclusion of an attorney's advice from evidence might produce that very result since it would
prevent a determination of whether advice by an attorney was
given in good faith and reasonably. Distinction as to whether
the advice was advanced (a) in good faith and with factual justifiction, or (b) with malicious intention and complete lack of
foundation in fact, would become completely irrelevant, and instead the attorney's statements would be extended protection
amounting in effect to an absolute substantive privilege.
9 Ex parte Cole, 6 Fed. Cas. No. 2,973, at 35 (C.C.D. Ia. 1879), cited
in the Bull case, is apparently the only reported case squarely on point.
10 Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association.
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There are policy factors militating against such a result.
Because the layman is encouraged to, and often does, place supreme confidence in the opinions of his attorney, any statements
reflecting on the operation or integrity of the judiciary are apt
to be taken at face value. If the court makes rulings adverse to
the client, he very likely will spread the attorney's remarks in
rationalization or recrimination. The harmful effect is apparent.
If litigants are to be encouraged to bring their disputes into the
courts for peaceful and equitable settlement, public opinion of
judicial integrity should be maintained at a high level. Exposing
the judiciary to reckless or malicious collateral attack by members of the bar could undoubtedly undermine confidence in our
system of jurisprudence.11 In fact, Canon 1 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics12 indicates that a lawyer should not attack
the judiciary collaterally. It provides:
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a

respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent
of the judicial office but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. Judges, not being wholly free to defend themselves,
are peculiarly entitled to receive the support of the Bar against
unjust criticism and clamor. Whenever there is proper ground
for serious complaint of a judicial officer, it is the right and duty
of the lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities.
In such cases, but not otherwise, such charges should be encouraged and the person making them should be protected.13

Admittedly, bona fide criticism of the judiciary may be necessary for adequate preparation of many cases; but the protection of reckless criticism seems unnecessary if any other means
of encouraging free expression by the attorney can be utilized.
It would seem, therefore, that the attorney-client privilege in
evidence should not be extended to protect legal advice reflecting
on judicial integrity, unless it might also tend to disclose a prior
communication from the client.
B.

WAIVER OF THE PRIVILEGE

It is interesting to note, however, that even if it be assumed
that all remarks by an attorney should be inadmissible, hazards
arising from the common law doctrine of waiver might deter
unrestrained expression by the attorney. 14 Case authority in the
11 These policy considerations led the court in the Bull case to admit
the attorney's remarks in evidence.
12 Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association.
13 Emphasis supplied.
H 8 \Yigmore, Evidence § 2327 (3d ed. 1940) treats waiYer of the privilege in general.
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waiver area has arisen almost exclusively in situations where
disclosures by the client are sought to be kept from evidencethe resulting secrecy benefiting the client. Hence, waiver of the
privilege has properly been based solely upon the conduct of the
client. It would seem, therefore, that where statements by the
attorney are sought to be kept out of evidence, waiver of its
benefit should be based only upon the attorney's subsequent conduct. An attorney might certainly be hesitant to speak if the
privilege attached to his remarks might subsequently be waived
by the acts of others. But the holding of the Bull case, considered with the historical and policy bases of the privilege, gives
reason to believe that when evidence of an attorney's advice is
introduced, a court may conclude that the privilege " ... is a protective device available only to or on behalf of the client,''1U and
therefore hold that waiver of its benefit is to be determined solely
from the client's conduct.
Because of this possibilty, various waiver situations will be
considered to point out the risks to which an attorney would be
subject if his privilege is merely evidentiary. The most frequent
situations where the attorney's remarks will be submitted in
evidence are disciplinary proceedings or tort actions against the
attorney. Ordinarily, in such proceedings the attorney's remarks
will have reached persons other than the client to whom they
were made or the action against the attorney probably would
not have been instituted. Where the remarks by the attorney
are oral, they may have been passed on to others in one of three
ways. They may reach others by some voluntary act of the
client independent of the attorney-client relation; for example,
the client may voluntarily pass the remarks on to others by word
of mouth. If the client fails to assert his privilege when the
attorney's remarks are later sought to be introduced into evidence, some courts would probably conclude that the privilege
has been waived. 16 Of course, if the client chooses to testify,
there is no doubt that his waiver of the privilege could not be
objected to by his attorney.17
In re Bull, 123 F. Supp. 389, 390 (D. Nev. 1954).
Assuming the hearsay problem could be solved.
17 Even if the client is not a party to the action against the attorney,
he may properly assert the privilege if called as a witness. The situation causing the trouble is where the client, though not a party to the
action, claims the privilege only to have it erroneously denied. There
are cases holding that a party to an action cannot take advantage of a
witness' privilege. See State v. Madden, 161 Minn. 132, 201 N.W. 297
(1924) and State v. Dunkley, 85 Utah 546, 39 P.2d 1097 (1935). Hence,
15

16

'
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Where the attorney's remarks reach third parties as a result
of being volunteered by the attorney, such a communication is
not made in confidence and the privilege does not apply.18 And
some courts hold that when a communication which would otherwise be protected under the attorney-client privilege is overheard, either inadvertently or by deliberate eavesdropping, the
"eavesdropping" party is competent to testify. Wigmore calls
this the "eavesdropper" rule.19 The rationale of the rule is that
the law will keep secret that which the attorney and client keep
secret; but any third person hearing the remarks will be competent to testify.20.
If the statements sought to be kept out of evidence are in
writing, substantially the same contentions of waiver can be argued. Where the writing reaches third persons by a voluntary
act of (a) the attorney, or (b) the client, the privilege cannot be
asserted, because in the former case the writing may no longer be
confidential, and in the latter case the privilege may have been
waived if the client does not assert his privilege at trial.21
Where the statements in writing come to the knowledge of
others by involuntary disclosure on the part of either attorney or
client, as, for example, by loss or theft, the disclosure can be
analogized to the "eavesdropper" situation. Following this line
of argument, it appears that if it were not for the constitutional
point in the Bull case, protection of the letter could have been
denied on one of two grounds, depending on whether it was
deemed foreseeable by the attorney that the letter would be intercepted and censored. If the censoring was foreseeable, it could
be argued that since the attorney should have known his statein some states the attorney apparently could not claim reversible error,
even if the privilege were asserted by the witness-client, but wrongfully
denied. :Model Code of Evidence. Rule 234 (1942) adopts such a view.
is Kruse v. Rabe, 80 N.J.L. 378, 79 Atl. 316 (1910).
w 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2311 (3d ed. 1940).
20 It seems that the "eavesdropper" rule has little to commend it in a
situation where (1) the client has not been negligent in allowing the
communication to be overheard, and (2) the communication might tend,
either directly or by inference, to disclose the nature of an earlier communication from the client. Rule 209 ( d) of the Model Code of Evidence
would modify the rule since it provides that the communication is "confidential" so long as the client is not aware that the means of communication has disclosed the information to third persons other than those to
whom the communication was reasonably necessary.
21 See notes 16 and 1 7 supra.
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ments would reach others besides his client, his disclosure was
voluntary, and hence his statements were not made in confidence.22
On the other hand, if disclosure resulting from the prison censorship is deemed involuntary, the censor could be likened to an
eavesdropper, and the censor would be competent to testify as to
the contents of the letter.
The preceding discussion has suggested that extension of an ·
evidentiary privilege to advice by an attorney questioning judicial integrity might not produce the desired results for two reasons: (1) since no inquiry could be made into the good faith or
reasonableness of his remarks, an attorney might be licensed to
make reckless and malicious attacks not intended to be encouraged by the privilege, and (2) the risk of disclosure resulting
from possible application of the waiver doctrine might discourage
uninhibited comment by the attorney.

II.

Qualified Substantive Privilege

Application of a qualified substantive privilege to an attorney's assertions, however, would avoid the problems inherent in
the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. Indeed, such a privilege
has long been recognized in the law of defamation. An attorney
may be privileged to communicate defamatory remarks to his
client.23 Furtherance of the attorney-client relation is felt to outweigh possible damage to third persons. But the privilege is subject to abuse, and the courts usually say that it is lost "if the
publication is not made primarily for the purpose of furthering
the interest which is entitled to protection."24 Such a rule acknowledges a substantive privilege for the attorney to speak freely
with his client so long as he has honest and justifiable motives,
and yet rather effectively prevents the privilege from shielding
reckless and unwarranted attacks upon third persons.
There is ample reason for applying a similar substantive
privilege to all remarks made about the judiciary in confidence by
an attorney to his client, whether the action against the attorney
221n Cotton v. State, 87 Ala. 75, 6 So. 396 (1889) an imprisoned client
made remarks to his attorney within earshot of the jailor. It was held
that the communication was not made in confidence, as both attorney and
client should have known that the jailor could overhear the client's remarks. Also, the client's constitutional right to counsel was not impaired since private consultation would have been granted had it been
requested.
23 Prosser, Torts 827, 834 n. 23 (1941); Kruse v. Rabe, 80 N.J.L. 378,
79 Atl. 316 (1910).
24 Prosser, Torts 850 (1941); Restatement, Torts § 603 (1938).
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be in tort, or in some other type of disciplinary proceeding. Of
course, the argument may still be raised that existence of the
possibility that an attorney's remarks may later be scrutinized by
a court or jury to determine his reason or sincerity in making
them may unduly restrict communication. But experience with
the qualified privilege in the law of defamation tends to contradict that argument. The privilege in that area of the law has
long been subject to the qualification that it be reasonably exercised, and there has been no indication that the administration of
justice has been unduly hampered by its use.
It has also been suggested that renderng an attorney susceptible to so-called "second-guessing" by a court or jury may in
certain instances result in an especially harsh penalty for what
may have been merely an ill-considered statement made in the
heat of anger, or the bitterness of disappointment. But severe
disciplinary actions, such as disbarment, ordinarily are not initiated by the bar for a single, isolated statement by an attorney,
unless it is terribly flagrant. Hence, the attorney will usually be
given prior warning that his conduct is not measuring up to required ethical standards, and only upon a repeated violation of
such standards will disciplinary action be instituted. When this
factor is considered with the policy reasons for giving the judiciary at least qualified protection from collateral attack by members of the bar, placing final judgment with the courts as to
whether the privilege has been reasonably exercised does not seem
to be an undue restriction upon the attorney-client relationship.
Charles J. Burmeister, '55

